第327手
第0手
第1手
第2手
(;* At the beginning [of this game], in an avalanche joseki at the lower right corner, 吴清源 9-dan's W #24 should have captured a stone cleanly [according to the joseki], but to lure B to extend out [the stone under atari], W chose to play a move at lower left corner instead. This unusual move, as an interesting inclination, certainly contained its speical understanding of the game, but it eventually brought W unfavorable results. Thereafter, Sakata 9-dan [B] gained with move after move, and to the middle game stage, B grabbed the lead. *)...
第3手
(;Overview continued)
(;* From then on, Wu fought hard all over the board. Gradually he pulled it even, and the outcome of the game became uncertain. But then, because of W #132 and #134's mistakes, B made an extraordinary move in W's territory, and B grabbed the lead again. 吴清源 9-dan then started a ko to struggle, and it turned out to be a favorable exchange for W. The situation thus turned sharply, and this time W had the lead. Finally, a big B team was invovled in a ko fight --- this was almost a free ko to W and B was therefore already in disadvantage, but B even decided to ignore the ko fight and jumped into endgame after tenuki. This ko would directly decide the game, and with even one more ko threat, W would force B to a state of despair. It became extremely tensive and violent on the board. At the end, since B was under time pressure and he had no time to do the most careful calculation, B lost points during the ko fight, and B ended up losing by 4 points. *)...
第4手
第5手
第6手
第8手
第10手
第11手
第12手
第24手
W #24's normal play [joseki] is to capture a stone at [a]. But if so, B would get the sente, leaving a possible jump of B[b]. Therefore, many people believe this shape [after W[a]] is B's thickness. Besides, under the current situation, if W #24 captures a stone, B would certainly gets #24 [D5] for a kakari move. Next ---
[*** 'B' to see a reference.]...
第26手
第29手
[And] #29. Thus, a big extension to [a] by B next would be a good move, since the shape of W's present enclosure at lower left leaves openings at the bottom, and B would be able to invade. However, had W's [D5] move played at [b], B[a] extension would not be so good. B #27 didn't go for an avalanche joseki, it was probably because of this thinking....
第33手
第34手
B occupies the good point of #33 [C8], but W too gets a thick shape by #34 connecting.
In the previous diagram, B #33 to extend to [a] is joseki. But the actual extension of #33 also aims at a subsequent ogeima B[b] to invade the corner. From this point of view, the distance between #33 and [b] is appropriate. If B tries to extend to [b] from [a] instead, there is a danger that W might counterattack with #33 [C8], an attachment on B[a] stone....
第35手
第36手
第38手
W #38 is the big point of fuseki. The three W stones at the left serves as a thick wall, and that's why W could extend as far as #38. If W tenuki here, and let B extend to [a], the difference would be huge. After this wide extension of #38, next W[b] hane, when B[c], W[d] hane again would be severe....
第40手
第41手
第42手
第44手
第45手
第48手
第52手
第54手
第56手
第59手
第61手
第62手
第63手
第64手
第67手
第68手
第70手
第73手
Then B #73 keima to invade W's territory, gaining some profeit first. At this point, B already leads on territory, so he avoids complicated fights like the one shown in the variation [at node 70]. Clearly, this is a wise choice.
To summerize the process up to B #73: W #44 did not capture a stone cleanly, and after B #45 extended out, W's working space became narrow, and his activities were thus limited. During the conflicts that followed, W was unable to make a comfortable path, and B finally grabbed the upper hand, invading into W's upper side, establishing a winning form....
第74手
第82手
第83手
When B #83, if W extends to [a] next, after B[b]-W[c]-B[d], B connects easily.
The big B team from the right side to the middle is not completely settled yet. If W loses the chances to attack this big dragon of B, W would lose the chance to win the game as well. Therefore, W's top priority now is to separate this B team from the B stones at the top....
第84手
第90手
第91手
第99手
第103手
第106手
第113手
第115手
第117手
第120手
第122手
If W #122 doesn't connect in a hurry, W's future moves would be difficult.
[For instance,] if W #122 tenuki and turns to the bottom, B would cut at #122, and next B[a] tesuji would force W into a dangerous situation.
[By the way,] W's lower right corner is alive.
[*** 'B' to see a reference on W's lower right corner.]...
第128手
第130手
第132手
第134手
第135手
第141手
第143手
第145手
第147手
第148手
第157手
第160手
第168手
第170手
第179手
第186手
第200手
第220手
第221手
第227手
B #227 this move to cut at [a] certainly gains more, but W wouldn't immediately answer B[a] with W[b]; instead, W would probably leave here as a ko threat.
Later in the game, a big ko fight will be created at the upper side, forming a situation that one more ko threat from either side would decide the game. Based on this, B #227 did not really lose anything. [It prevented W from getting one more ko threat, that is.]...
第230手
第234手
第238手
第241手
第242手
第260手
第271手
B #271 finally finished this heavy ko. Thus B let W get [a], and the outcome of the game is decided.
However, B #271 actually had another chance to struggle, this is, B #271 to extend at [b] instead, continuing the ko fight.
Had B chosen this path, what would the result have been?
[*** 'B' to see this *exciting* variation.]...
第272手
第284手
(;* The ko [M19] was very light to W; almost "worry-free". Therefore, B was already in a huge disadvantage. Yet, B even dared to ignore it [when B played [G2] cut], stubbornly to continue the ko fight. No one would have expected so. Had Sakata 9-dan had more time to ponder, he probably would have found the way shown in the variation to continue this struggle. *)...
第293手
(;* Sakata 9-dan engaged in such a complicated and enormous fight in the last minute [that is, byo-yomi period], and he refused to gave in even an inch. Such a fighting spirit was astonishing. Alas, he could not help the shortage of game time, and this fighting spirit was unable to hold to the end. In short, in a match between two unmatchable top players in the world, the winning chance turned hands throughout the game. This was indeed a rare masterpiece. *)...
第301手
(;* Toward end of the game, a ko fight in which one more ko threat from either side would decide the game appeared. In professional matches, ko threats are normally counted clearly before a ko fight is started. In this game, however, the result of the ko fight was unclear until almost the end; this was extremely rare. Perhaps because of the limit of the game clock, the players were unable to carry out throughout and accurate calculations; this could not have been helped. *)...
第311手
第320手
(;* After the war (;WWII), 吴清源 and 坂田荣男 played many time in major competitions. For example, 吴清源 vs. High Dans series (;坂田荣男 was then 7-dan) in 1949 (;Wu won by resignation on white); 吴清源 9-dan vs. 坂田荣男 8-dan 6-game series in 1953 (;Even; Wu 1 win, 1 jigo, and 4 losses); 吴清源 9-dan vs. 坂田荣男 8-dan 10-game series in 1953 (;Wu 6 wins, 2 losses); and in 1957 the 1st Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches, 1958 the 2nd Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches, 1959 the 3rd Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches, and 1961 the 1st Meijin Matches, they also matched many time. *)...
第0手
第1手
第2手
(;* At the beginning [of this game], in an avalanche joseki at the lower right corner, 吴清源 9-dan's W #24 should have captured a stone cleanly [according to the joseki], but to lure B to extend out [the stone under atari], W chose to play a move at lower left corner instead. This unusual move, as an interesting inclination, certainly contained its speical understanding of the game, but it eventually brought W unfavorable results. Thereafter, Sakata 9-dan [B] gained with move after move, and to the middle game stage, B grabbed the lead. *)...
第3手
(;Overview continued)
(;* From then on, Wu fought hard all over the board. Gradually he pulled it even, and the outcome of the game became uncertain. But then, because of W #132 and #134's mistakes, B made an extraordinary move in W's territory, and B grabbed the lead again. 吴清源 9-dan then started a ko to struggle, and it turned out to be a favorable exchange for W. The situation thus turned sharply, and this time W had the lead. Finally, a big B team was invovled in a ko fight --- this was almost a free ko to W and B was therefore already in disadvantage, but B even decided to ignore the ko fight and jumped into endgame after tenuki. This ko would directly decide the game, and with even one more ko threat, W would force B to a state of despair. It became extremely tensive and violent on the board. At the end, since B was under time pressure and he had no time to do the most careful calculation, B lost points during the ko fight, and B ended up losing by 4 points. *)...
第4手
第5手
第6手
第8手
第10手
第11手
第12手
第24手
W #24's normal play [joseki] is to capture a stone at [a]. But if so, B would get the sente, leaving a possible jump of B[b]. Therefore, many people believe this shape [after W[a]] is B's thickness. Besides, under the current situation, if W #24 captures a stone, B would certainly gets #24 [D5] for a kakari move. Next ---
[*** 'B' to see a reference.]...
第26手
第29手
[And] #29. Thus, a big extension to [a] by B next would be a good move, since the shape of W's present enclosure at lower left leaves openings at the bottom, and B would be able to invade. However, had W's [D5] move played at [b], B[a] extension would not be so good. B #27 didn't go for an avalanche joseki, it was probably because of this thinking....
第33手
第34手
B occupies the good point of #33 [C8], but W too gets a thick shape by #34 connecting.
In the previous diagram, B #33 to extend to [a] is joseki. But the actual extension of #33 also aims at a subsequent ogeima B[b] to invade the corner. From this point of view, the distance between #33 and [b] is appropriate. If B tries to extend to [b] from [a] instead, there is a danger that W might counterattack with #33 [C8], an attachment on B[a] stone....
第35手
第36手
第38手
W #38 is the big point of fuseki. The three W stones at the left serves as a thick wall, and that's why W could extend as far as #38. If W tenuki here, and let B extend to [a], the difference would be huge. After this wide extension of #38, next W[b] hane, when B[c], W[d] hane again would be severe....
第40手
第41手
第42手
第44手
第45手
第48手
第52手
第54手
第56手
第59手
第61手
第62手
第63手
第64手
第67手
第68手
第70手
第73手
Then B #73 keima to invade W's territory, gaining some profeit first. At this point, B already leads on territory, so he avoids complicated fights like the one shown in the variation [at node 70]. Clearly, this is a wise choice.
To summerize the process up to B #73: W #44 did not capture a stone cleanly, and after B #45 extended out, W's working space became narrow, and his activities were thus limited. During the conflicts that followed, W was unable to make a comfortable path, and B finally grabbed the upper hand, invading into W's upper side, establishing a winning form....
第74手
第82手
第83手
When B #83, if W extends to [a] next, after B[b]-W[c]-B[d], B connects easily.
The big B team from the right side to the middle is not completely settled yet. If W loses the chances to attack this big dragon of B, W would lose the chance to win the game as well. Therefore, W's top priority now is to separate this B team from the B stones at the top....
第84手
第90手
第91手
第99手
第103手
第106手
第113手
第115手
第117手
第120手
第122手
If W #122 doesn't connect in a hurry, W's future moves would be difficult.
[For instance,] if W #122 tenuki and turns to the bottom, B would cut at #122, and next B[a] tesuji would force W into a dangerous situation.
[By the way,] W's lower right corner is alive.
[*** 'B' to see a reference on W's lower right corner.]...
第128手
第130手
第132手
第134手
第135手
第141手
第143手
第145手
第147手
第148手
第157手
第160手
第168手
第170手
第179手
第186手
第200手
第220手
第221手
第227手
B #227 this move to cut at [a] certainly gains more, but W wouldn't immediately answer B[a] with W[b]; instead, W would probably leave here as a ko threat.
Later in the game, a big ko fight will be created at the upper side, forming a situation that one more ko threat from either side would decide the game. Based on this, B #227 did not really lose anything. [It prevented W from getting one more ko threat, that is.]...
第230手
第234手
第238手
第241手
第242手
第260手
第271手
B #271 finally finished this heavy ko. Thus B let W get [a], and the outcome of the game is decided.
However, B #271 actually had another chance to struggle, this is, B #271 to extend at [b] instead, continuing the ko fight.
Had B chosen this path, what would the result have been?
[*** 'B' to see this *exciting* variation.]...
第272手
第284手
(;* The ko [M19] was very light to W; almost "worry-free". Therefore, B was already in a huge disadvantage. Yet, B even dared to ignore it [when B played [G2] cut], stubbornly to continue the ko fight. No one would have expected so. Had Sakata 9-dan had more time to ponder, he probably would have found the way shown in the variation to continue this struggle. *)...
第293手
(;* Sakata 9-dan engaged in such a complicated and enormous fight in the last minute [that is, byo-yomi period], and he refused to gave in even an inch. Such a fighting spirit was astonishing. Alas, he could not help the shortage of game time, and this fighting spirit was unable to hold to the end. In short, in a match between two unmatchable top players in the world, the winning chance turned hands throughout the game. This was indeed a rare masterpiece. *)...
第301手
(;* Toward end of the game, a ko fight in which one more ko threat from either side would decide the game appeared. In professional matches, ko threats are normally counted clearly before a ko fight is started. In this game, however, the result of the ko fight was unclear until almost the end; this was extremely rare. Perhaps because of the limit of the game clock, the players were unable to carry out throughout and accurate calculations; this could not have been helped. *)...
第311手
第320手
(;* After the war (;WWII), 吴清源 and 坂田荣男 played many time in major competitions. For example, 吴清源 vs. High Dans series (;坂田荣男 was then 7-dan) in 1949 (;Wu won by resignation on white); 吴清源 9-dan vs. 坂田荣男 8-dan 6-game series in 1953 (;Even; Wu 1 win, 1 jigo, and 4 losses); 吴清源 9-dan vs. 坂田荣男 8-dan 10-game series in 1953 (;Wu 6 wins, 2 losses); and in 1957 the 1st Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches, 1958 the 2nd Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches, 1959 the 3rd Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches, and 1961 the 1st Meijin Matches, they also matched many time. *)...
